Introduction
Multi-hop cellular networks (also called hybrid networks) appear to be a promising combination of the dynamics of mobile ad hoc networks and the reliability of infrastructured wireless networks. These hybrid networks offer several advantages for users as well as operators. The network topology can be dynamically adapted to the respective needs reducing installation costs for the provider, the overall coverage area can be extended and nodes can reduce their energy consumption for transmitting packets due to shorter distances. However, several weaknesses known from mobile ad hoc networks persist. In the context of hybrid networks new possibilities to deal with these weaknesses become available. Besides the security and routing issues the cooperation among nodes is of great importance.
We propose a cooperation and accounting strategy for hybrid networks called CASHnet, which stimulates cooperation among nodes by making it a rewarding alternative to selfishness. Our scheme incorporates a security architecture, which is based on public key cryptography and uses digital signatures and certificates.
Several proposals have been made to stimulate cooperation among nodes. The first approaches were aimed at mobile ad hoc networks and enforced cooperation by threat of punishment. In the Nuglet [l] scheme a node can only transmit self-generated packets when it has forwarded enough packets from its neighbors before. In the CONFIDANT [2] approach the behavior of a node is monitored by its neighbors and a selfish node will be isolated from the network. In both concepts a node can be excluded from participating in the network without itself being at fault (starvation or collective false accusation).
With the Sprite [3] scheme rewards have been introduced as incentive for cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. Nodes report their forwarding activities to a central authority reachable via an overlay network. In conjunction with the missing security mechanisms this scheme seems highly vulnerable to attacks and transmission errors. In [4] the authors suggest the usage of rewards in multi-hop cellular networks and let a central authority collect and analyze reports to decide about rewards and punishments. However, the authors assume a single-hop down-link (from the base station to the node), which might not be available easily.
The authors of [5] and [6] propose similar charging schemes, where cooperative nodes get rewarded in a multi-hop cellular network environment. They both heavily rely on centralized accounting and security mechanisms. To remunerate intermediate forwarding nodes, both schemes require the complete route information from the sender to the receiver (e.g. using source routing). However, source routing does not scale well under high node mobility. Also, both schemes do not support cost sharing between sender and receiver, when both of them reside in different ad hoc networks. The sender also has t o pay for the distance from the gateway to the destination. To better cope with misuse the authors of [5] require all the network traffic to go via the operator's access points, which leads to inefficient routes for traffic within the same ad hoc network. [6] requires an existing AAA infrastructure, which might not be available for all multi-hop cellular network scenarios. In a recent proposal [7] , the authors extended their work from [5] .
They introduced a local Nuglet counter for each node to address the issues of inefficient routes in pure mobile ad hoc networks and a central auditing entity [4] to better cope with abuse. The weaknesses of the Nuglet scheme, such as the unresolvable starvation of selfish nodes due to a single counter and the unsuitability for civilian (commercial) applications because of neglecting the node's freedom of choice (to cooperate or to not cooperate) remain as well as the singlehop down-link.
Architecture and Operation
In our scheme we assume -similar to the Nuglet [l] approach -the existence of a tamper resistant device, such as a smart card in each node. This device ensures a protected environment, where the functions of our schemes can be executed safely. Also, we assume the availability of a routing algorithm, which provides the hop count to the base station (e.g. AODV or DSR) . Additionally, we require sufficient processing power and memory on the node.
For our scheme we define an architecture as displayed in Figure 1 . The CASHnet charging and rewarding mechanism works as follows: Every time a node wants to transmit a self-generated packet (i.e. node 0), it has to pay with n-affic Credits. Every time a node forwards a packet (i.e. nodes N A~ -N A~ and N B~) , it gets Helper Credits. Traffic Credits can be bought for real money or traded for Helper Credits at service stations. Gateways provide the interconnection between the fixed networks and the mobile ad hoc networks.
Our security mechanisms are based on public key cryptography. Nodes authenticate themselves using certificates issued by the provider. To avoid the cre- ation of bogus nodes, we give a short lifetime to the certificates to ensure that the node owner regularly visits a provider's service station. Transmitted messages are digitally signed to provide non-repudiation (data integrity and data origin authentication).
The operation of CASHnet is described in the following paragraphs. Figure 1 shows an example scenario to which all the defined steps can be applied. The following notation is used: each paragraph d e scribes a coherent phase of the operation process. A phase consists of several enumerated actions, which are executed consecutively. The processing of a phase can be terminated by a reference to another phase Setup Phase Before a node N can participate in the hybrid network belonging to operator P , node N has 1.
2.

3.
to perform the following steps:
Obtain a personal smart card from provider P which contains node N's unique identifier, node N ' s public/private key pair K N / K P N , a certificate C e T t p ( r D N , K N ) issued by the provider, as well as the provider's public key K p (onetime action).
Update node N's certificate C e T t p ( I D N , K N ) (as necessary).
Load the Traffic Credits account at the provider's service station by paying with real money and/or by transferring Helper Credits (as necessary). If a route changes and a new node joins the path, it is already authenticated to its one-hop neighbors due to the periodic neighboring authentication, yet the new node has t o authenticate the originator of the packet, which might cause a small delay.
Packet Generation Phase When a node 0 wants to transmit a self-generated data packet to the destination D , node 0 performs the following steps: 1.
2.
3.
4.
.
Discard the information from the previous node N -1 to retrieve the encapsulated original packet
Packeto. 
Gateway-specific Extensions
The gateway is responsible for forwarding traffic to the fixed network as well as to the ad hoc network. In the first case (ad hoc --+ fixed) it follows the steps of the Packet Reception Phase. The Packet Forwarding Phase however is done differently. The original packet Paketo is not signed, but sent unaltered towards the destination. The destination might be located in another ad hoc network, so that the packet will have to pass the corresponding gateway of that other ad hoc network. This is the second case (fixed -+ ad hoc). Here the Packet Reception Phase differs from the steps described above. No verification of the packet or transmission of ACK packets is necessary. The Packet Forwarding Phase is executed as described above.
Our architecture allows a gateway to act as a forwarding node for ad hoc only traffic. In this case it follows the steps described in both -the Packet Reception as well as in the Packet Forwarding Phase. As ad hoc only traffic is not remunerated, the Rewarding Phase is not executed.
Evaluation
The CASHnet scheme provides incentives for cooperation through monetary rewards. Instead of monitoring and punishing selfish nodes or putting the ability to transmit self-generated packets under the condition of having forwarded enough packets from other nodes, we make cooperation attractive. With the maintenance of separate accounts for traffic generation costs and rewards, we allow selfish nodes in our scheme. A node never has to be cooperative to earn its right for transmission, all it needs is enough Traffic Credits, which can be purchased at the service stations. If the node decides to be cooperative it also can trade in the earned Helper Credits at the service stations. In addition, the separation of accounts allows the provider to actively control the remuneration process of nodes. This enables the provider to build up and maintain strong relations with his customers.
Introducing money into any kind of system increases the risk of fraud. This is true especially in the case of multi-hop cellular networks where each individual node also acts as a router. Therefore we must take strong security precautions. The tamperresistant device allows for secure storage of keys and safe execution of functions. Due to the open environment we decided for a public key based infrastructure, which requires no direct key exchange. The use of digital signatures prevents the unnoticed modification of packets and uniquely identifies the packet originating as well as the packet forwarding node. Thus invalid (e.g. unpaid) packets will not be forwarded and rewards can be distributed safely.
The decentralized design has of course impact on the overall architecture requirements. The current security mechanisms (e.g. double signature verification) are costly in terms of processing power. Yet the environment of multi-hop cellular network enforces that we take the maximum security precautions possible and feasible at the same time.
While our security mechanisms ensure nonrepudiation and we assume a tamper resistant device, we do not yet actively handle malicious (i.e. nonrational) behavior of nodes. The most obvious could be the dropping of packets to be forwarded using a filter (e.g. a firewall). To cope with this problem we will study the possibility of introducing charges for the reception of packets similar to a deposit. Such a charge would be a fraction of the reward obtained from forwarding the packet. The node would have an incentive to recover the costs imposed by the reception of a packet and therefore more likely forward the packet to obtain the reward.
Anther issue is the coexistence with ad hoc only traffic, i.e. traffic that does not pass the gateway. In our current approach we do not charge for this kind of traffic. On the one hand, this seems fair towards the users, since they can also engage in ad hoc communication without the provider. On the the other hand, a user might try to reduce the cost of transmission by sending a packet ad hoc to a collaborative node located closer to the gateway and let this node "generate" and transmit it via the gateway. One could argue that this behavior is tolerable in the sense that no rewards have been distributed to the intermediate nodes and therefore no monetary loss occurred. Yet the provider makes available the security infrastructure which is also used in ad hoc only communication. Furthermore, these collaborative nodes could encourage the bypassing of our scheme by acting as a reseller offering a favorable price compared to the provider. This could result in a worst case scenario with a few nodes in the direct neighborhood of the gateway re-offering services to a totally uncontrolled ad hoc network. We identified this as a big issue and investigate possible solutions. An obvious solution is the introduction of charges for ad hoc only traffic.
While we could argue that our tamper resistant device protects us against any kind of attack, we feel that it is more realistic to assume that it does not, and therefore we continue study on other feasible ways to reduce the possibility of misuse and the computational costs for the nodes.
